The cost of sustainability on optimal portfolio choices by Stefano Herzel, Stefano et al.
 














1)  University of Roma Tor Vergata 
2)  University of Perugia 






SIRP WP 10-15 
 
Sustainable Investment and Corporate Governance Working Papers, 







   The cost of sustainability on optimal portfolio
choices
Stefano Herzel, Marco Nicolosi, C¸ at¸ alin St¸ aric¸ a
October 6, 2010
Abstract
We examine the impact of sustainability criteria, as measured by
the KLD scores, on optimal portfolio selection performed on an in-
vestment universe containing the equities in the S&P500 index and
covering the period between 1993 and 2008. The optimizations are
done according to the Markowitz mean-variance approach while sus-
tainability constraints are introduced by eliminating from the invest-
ment pool those assets that do not comply to di®erent social respon-
sibility criteria (screening). We compare the two e±cient frontiers,
i.e. the one without and the one with screening. A spanning test is
performed to determine if the di®erences between the two types of
e±cient frontier are signi¯cant. We introduce a measure of how much
an investor has to pay (through loss of return or through additional
risk) in order to satisfy given sustainability criteria. The analysis is
carried on separately on the three main dimensions of sustainability,
namely Environmental, Social and Governance.
11 Introduction
Investment choices based on Socially Responsible (SR) criteria are assuming
a greater relevance in today ¯nancial markets, both in terms of asset under
management and of number of investors. Often, a SR portfolio strategy is
implemented by eliminating from the investment set those companies that
have issues related to at least one of the SR criteria. This procedure is
called "screening" and can be implemented in di®erent ways, depending on
the emphasis put by the investor on di®erent type of concerns, and on the
depth (as percentage of the total number of assets or of market value) of the
screening. The issues of concern are commonly classi¯ed under three main
areas: Environmental (E), Social (S) and Governance (G), the so-called
\three dimensions of SR". Our analysis is based on the scores provided by
KLD Research and Analytics, a rating agency specialized in sustainability
issues for equities traded in the US market.
What is the impact of di®erent screening policies on the investment set?
How strong are its e®ects in terms of capitalization? It is obvious that
reducing the investment set diminishes the expected (risk-adjusted) returns,
but can such a loss be measured? Do the e®ects of screening change with
time or are they relatively stable? Does screening based on some of the SR
dimensions have stronger e®ects for the investor? How do such e®ects depend
on the level of screening and/or the level of risk that the investor is willing
to bear?
Questions of this nature are natural for any portfolio manager or re-
searcher with an interest in socially responsible investment. Quoting Kurtz
(1997): \one of the most important questions, still unanswered about SR
investment is: What does the e±cient frontier for a socially responsible in-
vestor look like, and what does it imply for asset allocation". This paper is
an attempt to provide an answer to these questions based on an investment
exercise performed on an universe comprising an almost exhaustive subset of
S&P500 ¯rms and stretching on a sixteen year period from 1993 to 2008. We
study how constraints based on the KLD sustainability scores a®ect port-
folio choices in the classical mean-variance optimization framework. More
concretely, we construct and compare quarterly the e±cient frontier corre-
sponding to the whole investment universe as well as those corresponding to
smaller universes where ¯rms with poor sustainability scores where removed.
1Several measures of the impact of SR screening are put forth1.
Earlier studies (such as Kinder at al. (1997)), compared the performance
of SR indexes (like the Domini Social Index) to conventional ones (for exam-
ple S&P500), reporting, in many cases, favorable results for SR screening2.
After Kurtz (1997) observed that such approaches were °awed by the fact
that they did not take into account di®erences in investment styles, namely
capitalization, price to book ratios and dividends, the use of three (or four)
factor models became a standard for this kind of analysis and a certain con-
sensus of the ¯ndings started to emerge. Stone at al. (2001) studied the im-
pact of SR screening on managed portfolios in the US equity market adopting
the SR rating provided by KLD and found no signi¯cant di®erences between
SR and not SR returns. Bauer et al. (2005) found, after controlling for
the investment style, no evidence of signi¯cant di®erences in risk-adjusted
returns between ethical and conventional funds for the 1990-2001 period.
Statman and Gloushkov (2009) analyzed returns on US stocks rated by KLD
during 1992-2007 and found no evidence that socially responsible investors
had a return advantage relative to conventional investors3. Amenc and La-
surd (2008) analyzed the performances of sixty-two SR funds in the period
2002-2007 by computing their alpha with respect to the Fama-French model.
In most of the cases they found a null or negative alpha, indicating that the
SR funds did not create any value beyond that predicted by their respective
exposures to the style factors. It seems hence relatively safe to state that
the general consensus is that, after taking into account the speci¯city of the
investment styles, the di®erences between the returns on SR instruments and
conventional ones, both expected and realized, tend to vanish.
The vast majority of the literature on SR investment, and all of the above
cited papers in particular, compares the returns of either singular assets, or of
1Needless to say, the results of any such analysis depend strongly on the choice of
the model adopted for estimating the inputs of the optimization procedure. In our case,
we used the three factor model of Fama and French (1992a) to estimate the covariance
structure of the assets and we set the expected returns equal to the market implied ones.
2No general consensus on the e®ects of SR screening on ¯nancial returns exists in the
early studies, some of them reporting a positive e®ect, others a neutral or even a negative
one.
3More precisely, they observed that active screening, i.e. longing companies with pos-
itive ranking and shorting those with negative ranking, may induce some positive e®ects
on returns, while passive screening only induces negative e®ects. The sum of the two
strategies is usually null or slightly negative. Hence they concluded that for a SR manager
it is important to perform some form of active screening of securities.
2actively or passively managed portfolios, usually after ¯ltering out the e®ect
due to investment styles. Our paper extends hence the existing literature
by a dynamical analysis of the e®ect of SR screening on the optimal mean
variance allocation process. While the previous literature uses already con-
structed investment instruments, we put together ourselves the investment
portfolios, mimicking the real-life situation faced by a portfolio manager that
has to implement SR constraints in her investment policy. We construct and
compare on a quarterly basis the e±cient frontiers corresponding to an in-
vestment universe with and without SR screening. We analyze the time
evolution of the \price of sustainability", de¯ned as the loss in the Sharpe
ratio due to shrinking of the investment set, for the three sustainability di-
mensions and for di®erent levels of risk and of screening. We ¯nd that the
\price of sustainability" is strongly related to the loss in capitalization4 but
also that it is surprisingly small comparing to the size of discharged market
value: an \all-concern" screening, that eliminates all the companies that raise
even a single issue of concern (more than 60% of the market capitalization)
decreases the Sharpe ratio by no more than 7% for a medium level of risk
(for details see Section 5).
2 The Price of Sustainability
In this section we formalize the optimization problem and propose a measure
for the impact of screening on the optimal portfolios. We consider a set of
N assets and denote their rates of return between time t ¡ ¢t and time t
by Ri
t;i = 1;:::;N. Let §t be the covariance matrix and ¹t the vector of
expected return of Ri
t;i = 1;:::;N at time t. The optimal allocation problem
4We ¯nd that companies with a higher capitalization raise more \Social" concerns. For
this reason, the S dimension is usually the one that produces a major loss in terms of
capitalization, for any level of screening. This is the main reason why screening based on







0¹t ¸ R (2.2)
N X
i=1
wi = 1 (2.3)
w ¸ 0 (2.4)
where w is a N-vector of portfolio weights, R is a parameter indicating the
minimum level of acceptable expected return, (2.3) is a balance constraint
and (2.4) is the short-selling constraint.
Screening is the most straightforward way to introduce SR constraints
in a portfolio choice. Companies not complying with given SR requirements
are simply removed from the investment universe. Hence, for any invest-
ment instance, this approach yields two portfolios: the optimal \screened"
portfolio, obtained by solving the allocation problem over the restrained in-
vestment universe and the optimal \reference" portfolio obtained by solving
the allocation problem over the whole investment universe.
For a given time t, let ¼t(R) be the ratio between the Sharpe Ratios of
the optimal \screened" portfolio and of the optimal \reference" portfolio, for
a level of expected return R. Note that ¼t(R) is always positive and smaller
than 1. We de¯ne the sustainability price at time t for a level R of expected
return as
pt(R) = 1 ¡ ¼t(R): (2.5)
This quantity measures the relative Sharpe Ratio loss due to SR screening.
We focus our analysis on three levels of minimum expected returns (three
di®erent values of the parameter R), associated to three di®erent levels of
risk. The ¯rst one is the expected return of the global minimum variance
(GMV) portfolio, which we will refer to as R1. Since we want to compare
portfolios on di®erent frontiers at the same level of expected return, the level
R1 is set as the highest expected return among the GMV portfolios for all the
frontiers considered. The second value R2 corresponds to the market level of
expected return and represents a medium level of risk. The third value R3
corresponds to the highest level of risk considered and is chosen such that R2
is the average between this return and R1. Note that the values of R1;R2
and R3 change with time.
43 Model calibration
In this section we explain how we obtain the inputs of the allocation problem
(2.1)-(2.4), that is the covariance matrix §t and the vector of expected returns
¹t. To estimate §t we adopt the Fama and French model (see Fama and
French 1992a, 1992b, 1993) as, probably, it is the most popular factor model:
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where RFt the risk free return, RM
t is the return of the market portfolio,
SMBt is the return of the small minus big market capitalization factor and
HMLt is the return of the high minus low book to market value ratio factor.
The ²i
t are the usual i.i.d idiosyncratic error terms with zero mean. The
coe±cient ®i represents the extra expected return of the i-th company that
is not directly explained by the sensitivities to the factors.
We estimated the factor loadings ¯1;¯2;¯3 by regressing the excess returns
of single companies on the mentioned risk factors5. We re-estimated the
model every three months between 1993 and 2008, using monthly data on a
window of length 5 years.
Let us denote with ^ ¯t and ^ ²t the N £ 3 matrix of the factor loadings
and the N £T matrix of the error terms as estimated at time t respectively.
The estimation is based on a regression performed at time t over past T
observations. Then the estimated covariance matrix §t is given by
^ §t = ^ ¯t \ covt(f)^ ¯
0
t + \ covt(^ ²) (3.7)
where c covt(f) is the variance matrix of the risk factors and c covt(^ ²) is the
(diagonal) variance matrix of the error term.
The vector of expected returns ¹t is set to match the market implied
vector of expected returns




t is the N-dimensional vector of the relative market capitalizations,
that is its i-th component is the ratio between the market capitalization of
the i-th company and the total capitalization of the market at time t. The
parameter ¸t represents the risk aversion of a representative agent. Since a
5The time series of the risk factors come from K. R. French's web site
5change in ¸ re-scales the excess returns without a®ecting the e±cient port-
folios and their variances, the price of sustainability pt(R) de¯ned by (2.5)
does not depend of ¸t.
This choice of ¹t can be interpreted as an assumption of market equilib-
rium since it implies the e±ciency of the market portfolio. It is a common
way to avoid the pitfalls of statistical estimation of the expected returns, a
notoriously di±cult issue, adopted, for example, as the starting point of the
popular Black-Litterman model (Black and Litterman 1992)6.
4 Social responsibility criteria
KLD Research and Analytics, Inc. rates the social responsibility of US com-
panies in seven areas: Corporate Governance, Community, Diversity, Em-
ployee Relations, Environmental, Human Rights, Products. For each of these
areas, KLD produces a number of indicators that come, each, in two °avors:
\strength" and \concern". The values these indicators take are 1 or 0. While
a point in a given strength indicator means that the company has a meri-
torious behavior with respect to the criterion in question, a value of 1 in a
concern indicator signals a weakness of the company relative to the criterion
related to that indicator. A score of zero indicates that the company has not
quali¯ed neither for a strength nor for a concern. In addition to the seven
major area already mentioned, KLD provides also negative ratings on con-
troversial business issues like Alcohol, Gambling, Firearms, Military, Nuclear
Power and Tobacco.
KLD's database is organized in annual spreadsheets. From 1991 to 2000
KLD research covered approximately 650 companies belonging to the Domini
400 Social Index and/or to the S&P500 index. From 2001 KLD expanded its
coverage to include the largest 1000 US companies by market capitalization
while from 2003, KLD provides ratings for the largest 3000 US ¯rms. The
sustainability data are assembled at the end of each year on the basis of
company's public information, corporate social responsibility reporting and
other information obtained trough direct engagement with the company (if
there is any). The scores are published in the month of January of the
following year. In our analysis the ¯rst portfolio allocation of each year is
done in the beginning of the month of March. In this way we make sure that
6Their proposers argued that "...the only neutral means is the set of expected returns
that would clear the market if all the investors had identical views".
6the KLD data set containing the sustainability scores of the previous year
has been already released. For our analysis we consider KLD data from 1992
to 2007 and consequently portfolio allocation from 1993 to 2008.
5 Empirical analysis
5.1 Data aggregation and screening
We start this section by describing how we processed the KLD data. For
every ¯rm covered, we aggregated the strength indicators and, separately,
the concern indicators for each of the seven sustainability areas mentioned
in the beginning of section 4. The aggregation was done by summing up
all the indicators and dividing by the number of indicators involved. Then
we aggregated the newly created indicators of the seven areas in the three
classical dimensions of Environmental, Social and Governance. Since two of
the seven sustainability areas are identi¯ed as Environment and Corporate
Governance, the Social dimension, was obtained from the aggregation of the
remaining 5 areas.
At the end of this procedure each company has a strength and a concern
score, standardized between 0 and 1, for each of the three macro-dimensions.
The returns for the companies considered in the optimization exercise
were downloaded from Datastream7. For each investment exercise we kept
only those companies for which there was a series of returns su±ciently long
(at least 5 years) to estimate the covariance matrix. We also deleted from our
set those ¯rms that were not identi¯able when matching the data of KLD
and of Datastream 8 After pre-processing the data we kept an average of
470 companies per year, with around 460 companies for the ¯rst years and
around 490 for the more recent years. The percentage of the market value
lost with respect to the market value of the S&P500 index is 5% on average.
Let us describe now the screening process applied to the investment uni-
verse. The screening procedures have been applied separately to each di-
mension following two di®erent approaches. The ¯rst approach, called "all-
7The data type used is \RI" that takes into account also for the dividends, assuming
that dividends are re-invested.
8KLD identi¯es companies by the CUSIP code only since 1995, before that year it
used just names, while Datastream adopts ISIN codes. Matching the two standards is not
always trivial, we are grateful to Cristiana Manescu for helping us with this issue.
7concern screening", removes from the universe of investments all those com-
panies that raised at least one concern in the considered dimension. We will
show below (Section 5.2 and Figure 1) that it is very invasive both in terms
of loss of market value and in terms of number of companies discarded. For
our analysis it has the additional drawback that the size of the investment
set changes from year to year. Another point worth noticing is that whole
industries might be excluded from the investment universe: for example, an
\all-concern screening" along the E dimension will probably eliminate most
of the companies in the Technology or Oil & Gas sectors.
The second approach we applied is a \partial screening" in which one
eliminates from the investment universe a ¯xed given percentage of the com-
panies for each industrial sector9. This approach keeps the size of the in-
vestment set constant. It has the advantage of preserving the diversi¯cation
across industrial sectors and, for this reason, it is often adopted to build SR
indexes, like for instance the popular Domini 400 Social Index.
We consider three di®erent percentages for the \partial screening": 10%,
30% and 50% of companies were eliminated. For each of the sustainability
criteria we sort the ¯rms on the basis of their concern scores. Companies
with a high negative concern are at the bottom of the list and are the ¯rst
to be eliminated. If there is a tie in the number of concerns, we eliminate
the companies with the smaller number of strengths. This procedure takes
into account both concerns and strengths and yields a set of allocation of
the same size over the whole time period under study. It is designed to yield
a screened investment universe that has the same composition, in terms of
industrial sectors, as the whole market.
5.2 E®ects of screening on market values and sustain-
ability prices
We start by examining the e®ect of screening on the investment universe.
Figure 1 shows the market capitalization percentage eliminated (top panel)
and the number of ¯rms remaining (bottom panel) for \all-concern" screening
along the three di®erent dimensions of sustainability. The ¯gure shows that
such kind of screening can be extremely invasive. Screening along the S
or G dimensions removes in recent years around 80% of S&P500 companies
9The sectors considered are: Basic Materials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services,
Financials, Healthcare, Industrials, Oil & Gas, Technology, Telecommunications, Utilities.
8and almost 90% of market capitalization. The e®ect of screening based on
the E scores is rather di®erent: it appears to be constant through time and
produces a loss of market capitalization of around 40%.
Figure 2 shows the market value percentage eliminated by partial screen-
ing, for di®erent levels of screening. We observe that the e®ect of partial
screening in terms of market value loss is rather constant in time, with screen-
ing along the Social dimension usually having a stronger impact.
A 10% screening eliminates up to 20% of market capitalization, while a
50% screening eliminates up to 70% for S dimension and 50% for E and G
dimensions.
Next we discuss the results of the portfolio optimization exercise. Table 1
reports the mean and the 95-th percentile of the temporal distribution (quar-
terly observations from 1993 to 2008) of the price of sustainability. Screening
is implemented for the main dimensions of sustainability separately (E;S;G)
and for three di®erent portfolios R1 R2, R3, corresponding to di®erent classes
of risk. This table provides an indication of the amount of Sharpe ratio loss
due to di®erent kind of screening, at di®erent risk levels and along di®erent
sustainability dimensions. For example, an investor who plans to adopt a
10% screening on the environmental dimension at the lowest possible risk
(R1) must be prepared to loose on average 1.5% of the Sharpe ratio but, if
she is unlucky (95% percentile), the loss can be as big as 3.6%. As expected,
her prospective loss decreases if she is willing to take on more risk choos-
ing the levels R2 or R3. We note that the loss increases with the level of
screening, but it remains relatively low for almost all cases (even at a 50% or
all-concerns screening). Screening along the social dimension is usually more
costly in terms of loss of Sharpe ratio than the other two. The loss is usually
greater and more volatile for portfolios of type R110.
The time evolution of the sustainability prices pt(R) corresponding to
the R2 level of returns for \all-concern screening" and for 10% screening
(the two extremes of the screening level) are displayed in Figures 3 and 4
respectively. For the \all-concern screening" we see that screening along the
E dimension produces the smallest drop in the Sharpe ratio: smaller than
1:3% in 95% of cases. Screening along the G and S dimensions can cause
maximal reductions of at most 5:1% and 6:4%, respectively. These numbers
10As we will argue in Subsection 6.1, the results for portfolio R1 are a®ected by stronger
estimation errors and are not always signi¯cant. For this reason we prefer to restrict the
discussion to portfolios of type R2 and R3.
9seem remarkably low, if one considers that the market capitalization loss can
be as large as 90%.
The overall picture emerging from the analysis is that of an hierarchy in
the percentage of Sharpe ratio loss due to screening based on sustainability
scores independently on the level of screening with screening along the Social
dimension being the most penalizing while that along the Environmental one
the least. Screening on Governance scores yields a reduction of the Sharpe
ratio closer to that of the S (E) screening for higher (lower) levels of screening.
We also note that portfolios with the R2 risk level are a®ected by a smaller
drop in the Sharpe ratio. Sustainability prices for R2 and R3 levels of risk are
rather stable during the whole period, especially for lower levels of screening.
6 Statistical Tests
This section presents some statistical tests on the results presented above.
The ¯rst test is on the robustness of the sustainability prices with respect
to variations in input data. Then we examine if discharging assets because
of a rule based on KLD ratings produces signi¯catively di®erent results, in
terms of the impacts on market capitalization and on sustainability price,
from those obtained by a rule based on random exclusions. The third and
the fourth tests compare the ex-post performances of the optimal portfolio
choices at the risk levels R1;R2;R3 and for di®erent levels of screening.
6.1 Robustness
Here we study the robustness of the sustainability price with respect to varia-
tions of the e±cient frontiers due to estimation errors. The e±cient frontiers
depend on the estimated covariance matrices, that is on the loading factors
computed by the regressions. One possible way to assess the robustness of
our measures is therefore to consider the asymptotic distribution of the load-
ing factors as estimated by regression (3.6) and then to simulate new values
for them. From the simulated values of beta we recompute a new covariance
matrix as in (3.7) and a new vector of expected returns as in (3.8), then we
perform a new optimization. Repeating such procedure a number of times
gives us a con¯dence interval for the sustainability prices. Figure 6 shows
the results of this straightforward (but computationally intensive) approach
to the case of 10% E-screening for the last month of allocation (December
102008). The three bars correspond to the simulated distribution of the loss
of Sharpe ratio for the three level of expected returns R1 R2 and R3. The
candles show the median and the 25-th and 75-th percentiles. Outliers are
represented as crossed points, while the circles indicate the loss of Sharpe
ratio measured for the three original portfolios, before resampling. It is ob-
vious that results are more robust with respect to the variability of input
estimates for portfolios R2 and R3, but very sensitive to the input estimates
for portfolio R1. Similar results apply also to other cases and make us be-
lieve that the high volatility of sustainability prices of portfolios R1 is due
to estimation error.
6.2 Random screening
Is there anything special with a screening based on SR criteria? What hap-
pens when the same number of assets is eliminated by following di®erent
rules? To answer such questions we applied a procedure similar to the \par-
tial screening" described in Subsection 5.1 with the only di®erence that the
¯rms were excluded from the investment set by a random choice and not
because of poor KLD scores. We repeated this procedure, which we called
\random screening", 100 times for each year of the sample. Finally, we com-
puted the percentage of market capitalization and of Sharpe Ratio lost after
each \random screening" to compare them with the corresponding quantities
computed after the \partial screening" based on KLD scores on the E, S,
and G dimensions.
The results of the experiment are shown in Figure 5 for the case of the 10%
screening and risk level R2 . The bottom panel of Figure 5 represents, like the
top panel of Figure 2, the loss in Market Value for a 10% screening. However,
in this case such a loss is compared to the distribution of the random sample
(the candles show the median and the 25-th and 75-th percentiles). The
¯gure clearly shows that the losses in capitalization due to the S screening
(represented by crosses) are, for most of the years, higher than those produced
by the other two dimensions and than those due to random screening. Also
the losses due to E screening (represented by circles) are usually very high
compared to the random sample. The fact that screening according to the
S and E criteria eliminates such a relevant amount of market capitalization
is re°ected in the loss of Sharpe Ratio for the level R2, shown in the top
panel of Figure 5, that is the analogous to Figure 4 with the addition of the
distribution candles. Here we see that the losses due to S or E screening are
11higher than most of those due to random screening. The G screening has a
lower impact on the loss of market value and, consequently, on the cost of
sustainability, although for the last years of the sample, it also produced a
few outliers.
6.3 Spanning test
The goal of this paper is to compare the mean-variance e±cient frontier cor-
responding to the unrestricted investment universe to that corresponding to
a smaller universe that excludes those assets that do not satisfy some sustain-
ability conditions. A spanning test, see Huberman and Kandel (1987) and De
Roon and Nijma (2001), is a statistical tool to check whether the di®erence
between two frontiers is statistically signi¯cant or only due to sampling error.
The test tells if the e±cient frontier built on an investment universe changes
signi¯cantly when other assets are added to the investment pool. Due to the
numerous instances of testing resulting from the dynamic approach that we
are advocating and from working with di®erent screening rules, we will apply
the spanning test in a particular set-up that we now describe.
Let us consider a market with three so-called \conventional" assets plus
three so-called \sustainable" assets. The three \conventional" assets are the
e±cient portfolios computed over the whole investment universe for the three
levels of expected returns R1, R2 and R3, while the three \sustainable" as-
sets are the corresponding portfolios computed over the screened universe,
for a given level of screening and a given sustainability dimension11. We
apply the spanning test to answer the question whether the mean-variance
frontier of the \sustainable" assets remains e±cient when the investment op-
portunities are increased to include also the \conventional" assets or, in other
words, whether adding the three \conventional" assets to the group of three
\sustainable" ones signi¯cantly enhances the opportunities of diversi¯cation.
In the standard framework of spanning test, one starts from an investment
universe with K risky assets to which one adds N assets. The ¯rst K assets
are usually called the benchmark assets while the additional N assets are
referred to as the test assets. In our case, the benchmark assets are the K = 3
portfolios optimized over the screened universe while the test ones are the
N = 3 e±cient portfolios computed over the whole investment universe for
11The returns of such portfolios are in fact the returns of dynamic strategies (or managed
funds) re-balanced quarterly over the period considered.
12the three levels of expected returns R1, R2 and R3. If there exists exactly one
portfolio for which investors can not improve their opportunities, then the two
frontiers have only one point in common and we say that there is intersection.
If there are no improvement possibilities by adding the \conventional assets"
to the set of choices, the two frontiers coincide and we say that there is
spanning.
Let Rt+1 be the vector of the returns of the \sustainable" assets and
rt+1 the vector of the returns of the \conventional" assets. As explained
in Huberman and Kandel (1987) and in De Roon and Nijman (2001), the
starting point of the spanning test is the linear relation
rt+1 = a + BRt+1 + ²t+1 : (6.9)
where a is a N-dimensional vector and B is a N by K matrix.
As shown in De Roon and Nijman (2001), in absence of short-sale con-
straints, spanning implies that the following conditions hold
a = 0; BiK ¡ iN = 0 ; (6.10)
where iK and iN are vectors of ones whose dimensions are respectively K
and N. The test statistic for spanning is hence a Wald statistic that is
asymptotically distributed as a Â2
2N with 2N degrees of freedom.
In the case of short-sale restrictions on the benchmark assets (see De
Roon et al. 2001) one has to divide the frontier of the benchmarks (\sus-
tainable" in our case) in sub-parts and to test spanning for each single part.
The constrained frontier has to be thought as the sum of parts of uncon-
strained frontiers, where each part is built over the subset of assets for which
constraints are not binding. Then the responsible constrained frontier spans
the frontier over the whole set of assets if there is spanning for each single
sub-part. When short sales are forbidden also for the test (\conventional" in
our case) assets, De Roon et al. (2001) show that to test the spanning for the
generic single sub-part of the frontier corresponds to test that 2N inequal-
ity constraints hold. Suppose we consider the j-th sub-part of the frontier
and let us indicate with R[j] the returns of the subset of assets over which
that part of frontier is computed. Suppose that the size of such a subset is
L[j] < K. Then one should run the regression (6.9) with R[j] as independent
13variables and testing for the following inequality constraints:
a + ´max(BiL ¡ iN) · 0;
a + ´min(BiL ¡ iN) · 0;
(6.11)
where ´min and ´max are the zero beta returns of the portfolios at the edges
of the j-th sub-part of the frontier we are considering (as shown in De Roon
et al. 2001) and the parameters depend on the index [j].
Let us note that the quantity a + ´(BiL ¡ iN) for a generic ´ is nothing
else than the vector of Jensen's alphas of the test assets with respect to the
e±cient portfolio of the L benchmark assets, whose zero-beta return is ´.
The restrictions (6.11) can be tested using a Wald test that in the case
of inequality constraints was studied in Kodde and Palm (1986). The test
statistic, under the null hypothesis is asymptotically distributed as a mixture
of Â2 with 2N degrees of freedom (see De Roon et al. 2001).
The results of spanning test are shown in Table 2 for all levels of screening
and for all sustainability dimensions. We separate the case of allowed short
selling (columns labeled "ss") from that of short selling not allowed ("no
ss"). The Wald statistic » is reported together with its p-value. Following
De Roon et al. (2001) we choose an upper and a lower bound to the zero beta
return of portfolios along the e±cient frontier corresponding to the screened
investment universe. We chose the lower bound to be ´ = 0 meaning that
investors have the possibility to invest their money in a risk-free asset with
zero net return. The upper bound for ´ is just the return of the global
minimum variance portfolio when short selling is allowed, corresponding to
the zero-beta return given by the intercept of the asymptote to the mean-
variance frontier. When short selling is not allowed the upper bound has to
be computed in order to take into account the e®ect of the constraints.
If short selling is allowed, the null hypothesis of spanning can be rejected
in most of the cases. It means that the e±cient frontier corresponding to the
screened portfolios and the one obtained over the whole investing universe
are signi¯cantly di®erent. For the lowest level of screening the spanning
hypothesis is rejected only for the E dimension. The levels of signi¯cance
of the test vary. In particular the test is highly signi¯cant for the highest
levels of screening and also for the E dimension independently of the level of
screening.
When short selling is not allowed, spanning can not be rejected when the
14screening is performed along the for S and G dimensions. This means that an
investor who allocates her wealth imposing constraints on the social or corpo-
rate governance performance of the ¯rms, does not improve the performance
of her portfolio by removing the CSR constraints. A signi¯cant di®erence is
instead found when the screening is performed along the E dimension even
at medium levels of screening. That is, even though short selling is not al-
lowed, restricting the investment universe based on environmental scores can
signi¯cantly reduce the performance of the investment.
6.4 Comparison of realized returns
In this subsection we compare the realized returns of the screened and non-
screened portfolios. More precisely, for each level of screening and for each
sustainability dimension we compare the Sharpe ratios computed on the real-
ized returns of the portfolios constructed from the whole investment universe
to the corresponding ratios of portfolios built from screened assets. We per-
form two di®erent tests for the di®erence in the Sharpe ratios. The ¯rst one is
a classical t-test. In order to compare the Sharpe ratios, the realized returns
were ¯rst standardized by local standard deviation estimates12. Then the
expected values of the standardized series of realized returns were compared.
The test revealed no signi¯cant di®erences.
We also implement a robust test for di®erences in the Sharpe ratios,
developed in Ledoit end Wolf (2008). The test is based on a construction
of a studentized bootstrapped con¯dence interval. The test is particularly
appropriate when the returns have heavy tails or when there is some auto-
correlation between the returns or their squares. The method also takes into
account ¯nite sample e®ects. The test is proven to be more robust than other
tests for the di®erence of Sharpe ratio (see for example Jobson and Korkie
1981).
This test con¯rms the results of the previous one: the di®erences in ex-
post Sharpe ratios between the two classes of portfolios are never signi¯cant.
This is not in contrast to the responses of the spanning test, because the
spanning test examine all possible combinations of the portfolios. In fact,
suppose that Sharpe ratios are not very di®erent, but the investment can be
improved by diversi¯cation, then the spanning test would reject the hypoth-
12The standard deviations were computed monthly using the observations of the previous
year and an exponential ¯lter with a decay parameter ¸ = 0:9.
15esis of spanning, as it happens for the case of allowed short selling.
7 Conclusions
We studied the e®ect of several kinds of Social Responsible screening on op-
timal mean-variance portfolios during the period from 1993 to 2008 for ¯rms
belonging to the S&P500 index. The analysis was based on the sustainability
scores provided by KLD, on the variances of the returns estimated by the
Fama-French three factor model and on the expected returns obtained from
the market neutral assumption of the Black-Litterman model.
We observed that the market capitalization eliminated by screening in-
creases with time, because ¯rms with higher capitalization are raising more
concerns, according to the KLD scores, especially in the Social and Gover-
nance dimensions, in more recent times. To summarize the e®ects of screening
we observe that the 10% partial screening eliminates up to 20% of the mar-
ket capitalization, while the 50% partial screening discharges up to 70% of it.
All-concerns screening may be even stronger: for example, in the year 2007,
the all-concerns screening in the Social dimension eliminates almost 90% of
the market capitalization. In general, Social screening has the strongest im-
pact in terms of capitalization because it tends to eliminate ¯rms with higher
market values.
We proposed a measure that we called \price of sustainability", based
on the loss of Sharpe Ratio after the screening. It measures ex-ante, that
is basing on the currently available information, what is the e®ect of the
screening on optimal portfolio choices. We observed that the level of the
\price of sustainability" is usually rather small, which can be unexpected if
compared to the extent of the loss in market capitalization. We analyzed
three levels of portfolio risk, which we called R1, R2 and R3, with R1 rep-
resenting the minimum risk, R2 the risk of the market portfolio and R3 the
most risky one. We observed that portfolios at the medium risk level R2 have
the smallest sustainability price and that sustainability prices for R2 and R3
are rather stable during the period of observation, especially for lower levels
of screening Comparing the three dimensions of sustainability we noted that
the Social one produces the highest sustainability price, while the smallest
one is obtained by the Environmental dimension, independently of the level
of screening. Screening based on Governance has an intermediate cost, usu-
ally comparable to that based on the Social dimension for higher levels of
16screening, and to the Environmental one for smaller levels.
We performed several tests on our results. We checked the robustness of
the sustainability price with respect to estimation error by performing a test
based on simulating the loading factors of the three factor model, obtaining
that the sustainability prices at levels R2 and R3 are robust, while at level R1
they are very sensible to input estimates. This explains the higher volatility
of the time series of sustainability prices at level R1. To examine wether
there is anything special with respect to the screening based on KLD scores
we compared it to a random rule and concluded that the Social screening
in general exclude a much larger fraction of market value than any random
choice. This is also re°ected in the price of sustainability. The ex-post
analysis of the realized returns of socially responsible and of conventional
portfolios corresponding to the risk levels R1, R2 and R3 shows that there is
not a signi¯cant di®erence in terms of Sharpe ratios. A spanning test shows
that the inclusion of conventional portfolios may improve the investment
opportunities by diversi¯cation, but only when short selling is allowed.
The general picture emerging from our analysis is that restricting the
investment set for Socially Responsible reasons has a strong e®ect on market
capitalization but at a small price in terms of Sharpe Ratio. From the point
of view of a responsible investor this is good news.
17The price of sustainability
R1 R2 R3
mean 95% mean 95% mean 95%
E 1.5 3.6 0.4 0.8 0.2 0.6
10% S 1.9 4.8 0.5 1.1 0.5 1.5
screening G 1.3 2.8 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.7
E 7.3 11.3 0.6 1.1 0.5 1.0
30% S 6.3 11.8 1.0 1.9 1.3 3.2
screening G 7.3 11.4 0.5 1.3 0.8 1.5
E 13.2 18.1 0.7 1.3 0.9 1.6
50% S 11.2 16.8 1.6 2.5 2.9 8.0
screening G 13.2 19.9 0.8 1.7 2.2 5.8
E 8.2 14.9 0.7 1.3 0.4 1.0
all-concerns S 20.1 36.7 2.8 6.4 5.0 12.2
screening G 14.7 36.6 2.8 5.1 4.8 16.7
Table 1 Mean and 95-th percentile of the time series (quarterly observations
from 1993 to 2008) of the price of sustainability for di®erent types of screen-
ing and di®erent levels of risk. Screening is implemented for the three dimen-
sions of sustainability, Environmental (E), Social (S) and Governance (G).
The risk levels correspond to the global minimum variance portfolio (R1),
the portfolio at the level of the market portfolio (R2) and a portfolio (R3)
symmetric to R1 with respect to the market portfolio.










































Figure 1 E®ect of all-concern screening during the period 1992-2007. Top:
percentage of market value discharged by all-concern screenings on the En-
vironmental (solid line), Social (crossed line) and Governance (dotted line)
dimensions. Bottom: number of ¯rms that have not been discharged by the
screening.





































































Figure 2 Percentage of market value eliminated by di®erent levels of partial
screening during the period 1992-2007 on the Environmental (solid line), So-
cial (crossed line) and Governance (dotted line) dimensions. Top: 10% par-
tial screening. Middle: 30% partial screening. Bottom: 50% partial screen-
ing.























Figure 3 Price of sustainability for portfolios at the level of risk R2 for the
all-concern screening on the Environmental (solid line), Social (crossed line)
and Governance (dotted line) dimensions.






















Figure 4 Price of sustainability for portfolios at the level of risk R2 for a
10% partial screening on the Environmental (solid line), Social (crossed line)
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Figure 5 Price of sustainability (top panel) and percentage of Market Value
discharged by screening (bottom panel) for portfolios of type R2. The candles
show the median, the 25-th and the 75-th percentiles of 100 samples obtained
by a 10% random screening. The corresponding values for the non-random
10% partial screening are marked by a circle for the Environment, by a cross
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Figure 6 Test of robustness for the 10% partial screening in the Environ-
mental dimension. The candles represent the median, 25-th and 75-th per-
centiles while the crosses represent outliers of the sustainability prices for
portfolios of type R1 R2 and R3 over 100 simulated scenarios. The circles




ss no ss ss no ss ss no ss
10% 16.82 6.65 4.00 1.16 8.58 2.80
screening (0.01) (0.12) (0.68) (0.65) (0.20) (0.42)
[***]
30% 37.80 8.53 11.93 1.01 12.06 3.86
screening (0.00) (0.06) (0.06) (0.66) (0.06) (0.30)
[***] [*] [*] [*]
50% 48.36 7.36 24.07 1.58 38.43 3.66
screening (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.57) (0.00) (0.33)
[***] [*] [***] [***]
All-con 52.55 10.56 31.57 1.43 45.57 2.05
screening (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.57) (0.00) (0.50)
[***] [**] [***] [***]
Table 2 Spanning test for di®erent types of screening and sustainability di-
mensions. The table represents the cases of short selling (ss) and of no short
selling (no ss). In each case it is reported the Wald statistic » and the p-value
(in parentheses). Rejection of the null hypothesis at the level of 10%, 5% and
1% is labeled by [¤], [¤¤] and [¤ ¤ ¤], respectively.
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